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1.  Introduction 
 
One of the most interesting features of the developed world is the fact that people in 
some countries work much harder than in others.  By work, we mean work in the 
market, not work overall, which is an important distinction.  For example, US and 
German households spend around the same proportion of their income on “food and 
beverages”.  However, in the US, around a half of this goes to restaurants, compared 
with only one quarter in Germany.  Far more time in the latter country is spent on 
food preparation at home (see Freeman and Schettkat, 2001)
1.  Despite this, in what 
follows we focus on market work, where the differences across countries are startling.  
For example, the average person of working age (16-64) works around 46 per cent 
more in the United States than in Belgium (see Table 1).  A little over half of his 
difference is because more people in the US are in employment with the remaining 
difference arising from the fact that those in employment in the US tend to work more 
hours per year.  These substantial differences explain the majority of the variation in 
GDP per capita among the advanced countries of the OECD, with differences in 
productivity making a significantly smaller contribution.  
 
When confronted with these differences, it is natural to look at the incentives to 
engage in market work relative to other activities in the different countries.  The 
particular feature of these incentives on which we shall focus are those embedded in 
the tax system.  To be more precise, we shall concentrate on taxes on employment 
paid by firms (payroll taxes), taxes on income paid by individuals and taxes on 
consumption paid by individuals.  Important features of the overall incentive structure 
which we shall not discuss in detail include the unemployment benefit system, the 
sickness and disability benefit system and the early retirement benefit system.  These 
are obviously an important part of the overall picture given that those in the 
population of working age who do not work fall into five major categories, namely 
full-time students, the unemployed, the sick and disabled, the early retired and those 
looking after their family. 
 
In what follows, we look briefly at the theoretical background in the next section.  
Then in Section 3 we present an array of results on taxes, wages and employment and  
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in Section 4 we consider non-employment among different sub-groups of the 
population of working age.  We finish with a summary and some general conclusions. 
 
2.  Theoretical Background 
 
A great deal has been written on taxation and employment and useful summaries are 
provided by Pissarides (1998) or Koskela (2002).  The basic model looks something 
like the following.  Using a representative agent model, with the population of 
working age normalised to unity, we may define h as (market) work and then (1-h) is 
non-work.  Let output y be generated by the production function: 
            ( 1 )  
α αh Bk y
− =
1
where k is capital.  Representative utility is given by  
  u ( h c − + = 1 ln ln ) θ         ( 2 )  
where c is consumption.  Suppose W is nominal labour cost per employee and P is the 
price of the firm’s output.  So  P W w = is the real labour cost per employee facing the 
firm.  Then suppose we have proportional tax rates as follows.  The payroll tax rate is 
, the income tax rate is t , the consumption tax rate is  .  Then the real post-tax 
consumption wage is given by  
1 t 2 3 t
   ( )( )











    say.      (3) 
Soτ is the “tax wedge” between the real labour cost per employee facing the firm and 
the real post-tax consumption wage.  Note that τ is given by 










− = τ   ≃( ) 3 2 1 t t t + +      (4) 
 
In equilibrium, the marginal product of labour is equal to real labour cost per 
employee and the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is 
equal to the real post-tax consumption wage.  Thus we have  
   w h y = α          ( 5 )  









        ( 6 )  
Eliminating w yields 
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h         ( 7 )  
 
which is diminishing in  .  The size of the impact of 
2 τ τ  depends crucially on θ .  
Prescott (2002) calibrates this equation and uses it to generate predicted labour supply 
for seven OECD countries and finds that it matches actual labour supply quite closely.  
How his results square with others in this area is discussed in the next section. 
 
It might, however, be argued that in Europe, some sort of bargaining model of wage 
determination would be more realistic.  Suppose we have identical firms, labelled i, 
and that wages are determined by a Nash bargain which maximises 
        (8)  () ( ) ( [ i n i i i A y w w h Π − + −
β γ τ 1 ) ]
where  is real, post-tax, per capita non-labour income, A is expected alternative 
income if not employed in firm i and 
n y
Πis the firm’s profit.  The parameter 
γ measures the extent to which the worker takes account of the employment effects of 
the wage bargain.  Purely individualistic bargaining would be associated with low 
levels of γ , collective bargaining with high levels.  The β parameter captures the 
relative strength of the worker in the bargain.  
 
Expected alternative income A consists of two elements, that generated by 
employment in another firm with income  ( ) n y w + −τ 1 , probability  , and that 
generated by non-employment with income 
h
( ) y bw n z + + −τ 1 , probability  .  b 
represents non-employment benefit relative to post-tax employment income, z 
captures the real value of the leisure when not employed.  So A is given by 
( h − 1 )
   () () ( ) ( ) ( ) z y bw h y w n n h A + + − − + + − = τ τ 1 1 1    (9) 
 
If (8) is maximised with respect to   and noting that the production function (1) 
ensures that 
i w
( ) ( ) α − α = Π − = ∂
− 1 h w w n h n i i i
1
i i / / , / l l α − 1 ∂ , the first order 
condition implies that 
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                              (10) 
 
Noting that identical firms implies that  w wi = , and using (9), (10) becomes 
  () () () ( α + βγ α − β = − − − 1 z b 1 h 1 )     
 (11) 
where () τ − = 1 w z z .  So, in this context, the only reason why taxes impact on 
employment is because the value of leisure enters “income” while not working and is 
unaffected by a change in the tax wedge.  Non-labour income plays no role essentially 
because in this model, only the difference between income when employed and when 
not employed is relevant and non-labour income is eliminated.  
 
Suppose we define potential output,  y , by 
                                 
α − =
1 Ak y ,      ( 1 2 )  
that is the output if the whole population works.  Then        
                                () ( ) τ α
α − = − =
− 1 / 1 /
1 y zh z w z z and (11) becomes  
                            ()( () () ( )
α + βγ
α − β
= τ − α − − −
α − 1
) 1 / h y / z b 1 h 1
1   
 (13) 
which implies  0 / < ∂ ∂ τ h so long as benefits and the value of leisure are less than the 
post-tax wage.  Of course, if this were not the case, no one would work. 
 
In these models, market work depends only on the total tax wedge,τ .  There are a 
number of reasons why the impact of the different tax elements of τ  on market work 
may differ.  First, in the above model, suppose the utility of income is not linear.  
Then non-labour income is not eliminated.  Since non-labour income is typically  not 
subject to payroll taxes, then the impact of the payroll tax rate on work may differ 
form that of the income tax or consumption tax rate (see Hoon and Phelps, 1995 for 
example).  Second, suppose there is a wage floor, because of minimum wage laws, for 
example.  Then, for those at or near the wage floor, a switch from income taxes to 
payroll taxes will reduce employment.  Third, the fact that, in practice, the tax base  
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for the three different taxes generally differs ensures that switches between them will 
not be neutral.   
 
Another feature of these models is that the taxes are all proportional.  Income taxes 
are often progressive and the degree of progressivity may, itself, have an independent 
impact.  For example, in a bargaining model, increased progressivity leads to lower 
wage demands because wage increases are less valuable and this generates more 
work.  The standard labour supply effect, however, typically goes in the other 
direction. 
 
To summarise, therefore, there are good theoretical reasons why the total tax wedge 
may have a negative impact on work and why the individual tax rates which make up 
the total wedge may have differing effects.  The size of these potential effects is 
obviously an empirical matter, so this is the topic of the next section. 
 
3.  Tax Effects on Work and Pay 
 
We start by looking at the general size of the tax wedge in the OECD countries over 
the years (see Table 2).  All countries exhibit a substantial increase over the period 
from the 1960s to the 1990s although there are wide variations across countries.   
These mainly reflect the extent to which health, higher education and pensions are 
publicly provided along with the all-round generosity of the social security system.  
Some countries have made significant attempts to reduce labour taxes in recent years, 
notably the Netherlands and the UK.  Underlying these numbers are some significant 
variations in the individual tax rate
5 notably Denmark and Australia have tiny payroll 
tax rates whereas as those in Italy and France are very substantial, being around 40 
per cent. 
 
Turning to the evidence, this comes typically in two forms.  The first is the impact of 
taxes on labour costs per employee facing firms, the second focuses directly on the 
effect of taxes on aspects of labour input.  The former is relevant because in order for 
taxes to reduce work, they must raise labour costs per employee so that firms reduce 
their demand for labour.  If tax increases leave labour costs per employee unchanged, 
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 then they are all shifted onto labour and employment is unaffected.  In the remainder 
of this section, we first consider whether different taxes have different effects.  Then 
we look at the impact of the tax wedge on real labour costs per employee and finally 
the impact of the tax wedge on aggregate labour input. 
 
Different Tax Effects 
The key issue here is whether different taxes exhibit differential rates of shifting onto 
labour.  There are a large number of time series wage equations for various countries 
which show different degrees of shifting onto labour for different taxes.  There is no 
pattern to these numbers
3, many of which are summarised in Layard et al.  (1991) 
p.210, OECD (1994), p.247, Disney (2000), and Koskela (2002).  Some intensive 
cross-country investigations may be found in the work of Tyrväinen reported in 
OECD (1994), Table 9.5 and in that of Robertson and Symons in OECD (1990), 
Annex 6A.  In both these wide-ranging studies, there is no significant evidence that 
payroll, income or consumption taxes have a differential impact on labour costs and 
hence on unemployment.  As the OECD Jobs Study (1994) remarks, “Changes in the 
mix of taxes by which governments raise revenues can be expected, at most, to have a 
limited effect on unemployment” (p. 275). 
 
Tax Wedge Effects on Real Labour Cost per Employee 
In OECD (1990), Annex 6, a simple test of the impact of tax rates on labour costs is 
carried out as follows.  We have labour demand and labour supply equations of the 
form 
    (),
1 K w f N
D = ( )L z T w f N
S ,
2 − =  
where N = employment, w = ln (real labour cost), K = capital stock, T = (t1+t2+t3), the 
total tax rate, L = the labour force, z = exogenous factors.  Then the reduced form 
wage equation is 
 
  w = g(T,K/L,z). 
 
If w is independent of T in the long run, the labour market behaves as if labour supply 
is inelastic and taxes are all shifted onto labour.  Employment, and hence  
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unemployment is then unaffected by T in the long run.  The following equation 
represents the average coefficients and t statistics for individual time series 
regressions on 16 OECD countries (1955-86). 
 
    () ()() 6 . 2 6 . 0 0 . 2 ) 7 . 8 (
. 52 . 0 08 . 0 ) / ( 181 . 0 79 . 0 1 T T L K n w w ∆ + − + = −
Thus total taxes, T, have no long-run effects on labour costs although they have a 
substantial and long-lasting short-run effect via  T ∆  (and the high level of persistence 
in wages).  Consistent with this result is the work discussed in Gruber (1997) on the 
incidence of payroll taxation.  Gruber studies the impact on wages and employment at 
the micro level of the sharp exogenous reduction in payroll tax rates (of around 25 
percentage points!) which took place in Chile over the period 1979-86.  His analysis 
of a large number of individual firms indicates that wages adjust completely to this 
payroll tax shift and there is no employment effect whatever. 
 
In contrast to this result, two multi-country studies find significant tax wedge effects 
on labour costs.  Daveri and Tabellini (2000) find that a 10 percentage point increase 
in the tax wedge raises real labour costs by 5 per cent in the long run for a select 
group of countries
4, although there are few controls for other labour market 
institutions (see Table 11, col. 1).  Nickell et al. (2003) report an equivalent figure of 
3.7 per cent controlling for a complete set of labour market institutions (see Table 12. 
col.1).  Many others have found significant tax wedge effects on labour costs, and 
some have argued that the size of these tax wedge effects depends significantly on 
those labour market institutions connected with flexibility (see Liebfritz et al., 1997 
and Daveri and Tabellini, 1997).  In order to pursue this, we set out some results on 
the impact of the tax wedge on labour costs in Table 3.  The first point to note is how 
wildly the numbers and the rankings fluctuate across the columns.  This is basically 
due to variations in the other variables included in the labour cost equations and 
emphasises the fragility of most of the results in this area.  Second, in order to see if 
there is any relationship between tax wedge effects and labour market flexibility we 
regressed the average tax wedge effect on some institutional variables to obtain: 
Tax wedge effect = Constant +    0.030 employment protection 
                           (0.9)  
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-  0.005 labour standards 
(0.1) 
-  0.16 co-ordination (union + employer) 
                                                     (1.7) 
+   0.004 union density (average) 
             (0.6) 
    N   =   2 0 ,   R
2 = 0.23. 
  
While most of the signs are consistent with the hypothesis, the negative impact of 
wage bargaining co-ordination is the only one which is significant (at the 10 per cent 
level).  So the evidence in favour of the hypothesis that flexibility reduces tax wedge 
effects is not strong.  Overall, however, the balance of the evidence suggests that there 
is probably some overall adverse tax effect on real labour costs per employee.  The 
possible consequences for the impact on employment we report in the next section. 
 
Tax Wedge Effects on Employment 
An array of results in this area is presented in Table 4.  While there is some 
variability, overall they tell a reasonably consistent story.  If we omit the outliers on 
the high side (Prescott, 2002;  Daveri and Tabellini, 2000;  Planas et al., 2003) on the 
grounds that they exclude important control variables, we find that a 10 percentage 
point rise in the tax wedge reduces labour input by somewhere between 1 and 3 per 
cent of the population of working age.  Taking an average point estimate as 2 per cent, 
this is a relatively small but by no means insignificant effect.  For example, the 
average rise in the tax wedge in the advanced OECD countries from the early 1960s 
to the late 1990s is around 15 percentage points, worth a reduction in labour input of 
around 3 per cent of the population of working age
5.  Comparing the big three 
countries of continental Europe (France, Germany and Italy) with the United States, 
the difference in the tax wedge (around 16 percentage points) would explain around 
3.2 percentage points of the difference in total labour input which is around one 
quarter of the overall difference in the employment rate.  The remainder would be 
down to other factors including, in particular, the substantial differences in the social 
security systems, as well as other labour market institutions.  In the next section we 
pursue these issues a little further by looking more closely at the labour input rates for 
different groups in the working age population. 
 
4.  Labour Inputs Across Different Groups 
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The overall picture for OECD countries is presented in Tables 5 and 6.  We ignore 
inactivity rates among the young because these are strongly influenced by the extent 
of post-school education and whether or not post-school education takes place mainly 
within educational institutions, as in the US, or in firms, as in Germany. 
 
Focussing first on prime age men (age 25-54), we see that even among this group, in 
most countries more are inactive than are unemployed.  Furthermore, the inactivity 
rate in this group is higher in the US than in the European Union.  Interestingly, most 
inactive men in this age group are classified as sick or disabled, the majority of whom 
are claiming some form of state benefit.  Furthermore, the size of this disability group 
has risen substantially since the 1970s in nearly every country, and in those which 
have been analysed, this increase has been driven by changes in the entry rules and 
the available benefits (see Bound and Burkhauser, 1999, for some detailed evidence). 
 
Among older men, unemployment rates are generally much the same as for prime age 
men, but inactivity rates are enormously larger and vary dramatically from one 
country to another.  In some European countries, more than half the older men are 
inactive, whereas in Norway and Sweden, the inactivity rate is closer to one quarter.  
As Blondal and Scarpetta (1998) note, these large cross-country variations were not 
apparent as recently as 1971, when nearly all the countries had inactivity rates for this 
group below 20 per cent, the major exception being Italy with a rate of 41 per cent, 
(see Blondal and Scarpetta, 1998, Table V.1, p.72).  The main factor explaining the 
current variations and the consequent large changes since 1971 has been the structure 
of the social security system.  Incentives for men to stay in the labour force vary 
widely, with generous incentives to retire early being introduced in many countries.  
This was often done in order to reduce labour supply in the mistaken view that this 
would help to resolve the problem of unemployment.  As a consequence, Belgium, 
France, Germany and Italy, for example, all have exceptionally high inactivity rates 
among older men on top of their exceptionally high unemployment rates. 
 
Inactivity rates among women aged 25 to 54 also vary widely, with the Scandinavian 
countries having the lowest rates in the OECD, and Italy and Spain having the 
highest.  While the majority of inactive women in this age group report themselves as  
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looking after their family, Italy and Spain in fact have the lowest fertility rates in the 
OECD.  What is important here is the structure of the tax system, particularly the 
marginal tax rate facing wives when their husbands work, the existence of barriers to 
part-time work, and the availability of publicly funded child care.  A key tax issue 
which is relevant here is whether husbands and wives are taxed jointly or separately 
(see OECD, 1990, Table 6.3.) 
Finally, it is worth noting how unemployment in Italy, Spain and to a lesser extent 
France is heavily concentrated among young people and women.  This is partly due to 
the role of employment protection laws in generating barriers to employment for new 
entrants and partly due to the social mores surrounding entry into work.  For example, 
in Italy many young people, particularly if they are well qualified, will live at home 
for many years without working but effectively queuing for a particularly desirable 
job and contributing to measured unemployment (although perhaps not to true 
unemployment). 
 
To summarise, looking at different sub-groups of the working age population, the 
numbers suggest that many factors other than standard tax rates are important in 
determining the extent of non-employment.  This is consistent with the overall 
conclusion of the previous section that tax rates explain only a fraction, albeit a 
significant one, of the cross-country differences in employment rates (see also Bertola 
et al. 2002 where the results have similar implications). 
 
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
Our basic conclusion is that tax rates are a significant factor in explaining differences 
in the amount of market work undertaken by the working age population in different 
countries.  However, the evidence suggests that tax rate differentials only explain a 
minority of the market work differentials, the majority being explained by other 
relevant labour market institutions.  Particularly important are the differences in social 
security systems which provide income support to various non-working groups 
including the unemployed, the sick and disabled, and the early retired. 
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Table 1 














 2001  2002 
(latest 
data)** 
      
Europe            
Austria 3.6  4.1 29.3  67.8  -  - 
Belgium 6.6  6.9  36.4  59.7  1528  17.5 
Denmark 4.3  4.2  21.8  75.9  1482  21.6 
Finland 9.1  8.9 25.4  67.7 1694  22.0 
France 8.6  9.2  32.0 62.0  1532  18.3 
Germany 7.9  8.3  28.4  65.9  1467  18.6 
Ireland 3.8  4.4  32.5  65.0  1674  20.9 
Italy 9.5  9.2  39.3  54.9  1606  17.0 
Netherlands 2.4  2.8  24.3  74.1  1346 19.2 
Norway 3.6  3.9 19.7  77.5 1364  20.3 
Portugal  4.1  4.4  28.2  68.7         2009***  26.5 
Spain 10.7  11.2  34.2 58.8  1816  20.5 
Sweden 5.1  5.0 20.7  75.3 1603  23.2 
Switzerland  2.6  2.6  18.8  79.1    1568*  23.8 




7.6  - 30.8 64.1  - 
 
- 
Australia 6.7  6.5  26.2  68.9  1837  24.4 
Canada  7.2  7.5  23.5  70.9    1801*  24.6 
Japan  5.0  5.4  27.4  68.8    1821*  24.1 
New Zealand  5.3  5.3  24.1  71.8  1817  25.1 
US 4.8  5.6  23.2  73.1  1821  25.6 
 
*refers to 2000.  **refers to the period between Feb and Aug 2002.  *** refers to 1994. 
 
OECD Employment Outlook 2002, Tables A, B, F. 
 
Unemployment is based on OECD standardised rates.  These approximate the ILO definition.  Hours 
per year is an average over all workers, part-time and full time.  Average hours per week refers to the 
entire population of working age and is equal to the proportional employment rate x hours per year ÷ 
52. 




Total Taxes on Labour 
 
Payroll Tax Rate plus Income Tax Rate plus Consumption Tax Rate 
 
Total Tax Rate (%) 
 
  1960-64 1965-72 1973-79 1980-87  1988-95  1996-2000 
 
Australia  28  31  36  39  -          - 
Austria  47  52  55  58  59                    66 
Belgium  38  43  44  46  49                    51 
Canada  31  39  41  42  50                    53 
Denmark  32  46  53  59  60                    61 
Finland  38  46  55  58  64                    62 
France  55  57  60  65  67                    68 
Germany (W)  43  44  48  50  52                    50 
Ireland  23  30  30  37  41                    33 
Italy  57  56  54  56  67                    64 
Japan  25  25  26  33  33                    37 
Netherlands  45  54  57  55  47                    43 
Norway  -  52  61  65  61                    60 
New Zealand  -  -  29  30  -                      - 
Portugal  20  25  26  33  41                    39 
Spain  19  23  29  40  46                    45 
Sweden  41  54  68  77  78                    77 
Switzerland  30  31  35  36  36                    36 
UK  34  43  45  51  47                    44 
USA  34  37  42  44  45                    45 
 
 
Note:   
These data are based on the London School of Economics, Centre for Economic Performance OECD 
dataset (see the data attached to DP502 at http://cep.lse.ac.uk/papers/).  They are mainly based on 
OECD National Accounts as follows: 
 
(i)  Payroll tax rate = EC/(IE-EC),EC=EPP+ESS.EPP = employers’ private pensions and welfare 
plans contributions, ESS = employers’ social security contributions, IE = compensations of 
employees. 
(ii)  Income tax rate = (WC+IT)/HCR. WC = employees’ social security contributions, IT = income 
taxes, HCR = households’ current receipts. 
(iii)  Consumption tax rate = (TX-SB)/CC.  TX = indirect taxes, SB = subsidies, CC = private final 
consumption expenditure.  The inclusion of EPP in the payroll tax rate may be subject to 
debate.  Excluding this term has little impact on the broad overall pattern of the numbers. 




Percentage Increase in Real Labour Cost in Response 
To a One Percentage Point Rise in the Tax Wedge 
 
  1  2 3 4 5 6 
 BLN  T  AP  P-SK  Kvd  W  Average 
 
Austria 0     0  0 
Belgium  3.4   .37  .95   1.57 
Denmark 0    .28 0   0.09 
Finland 0.2  0.5  0.28    0.33 
France 0.5  0.4  0.37  0  0.56  0.37 
Germany (W)  0  1.0  0.37  0  0.72  0.42 
Ireland  1.4       1.4 
Italy 0.3  0.4  0  0  1.03  0.35 
Netherlands 0.4    0.37  0  1.15  0.48 
Norway 0.2  0.28    0.24 
Spain 1.0       1.0 
Sweden  0.5 0.6  0.28 0.73 0.70 0.56 
Switzerland  1.4       1.4 
UK 1.3  0.25  0  0  0.58  0.43 
Japan 0  0.5  0    1.19  0.42 
Australia -  0.5  0.37  1.64  0.84 
New  Zealand  0       0 
Canada 1.5  0.8 0   0.59  0.72 
US 0.1    0    0.43  0.18 
 
BLN =  Bean  et al (1986), Table 3 and 5 (except the number for Spain  which is taken from  
   Dolado  et al (1986). 
 
T   =  Tryväinen (1995) as reported in OECD Jobs Study (1994), Table 9.5 (except  
      Sweden’s number which is from Holmlund and Kolm (1995). 
 
AP  =  Alesina and Perotti (1994), Table 7, Col. 4. 
 
P-SK  =  Padoa-Schioppa Kostoris (1992). 
 
Kvd W =  Knoester and van de Windt (1987). 
 
Some of these numbers are taken directly from Leibfritz et al (1997), Table A1.5. 
 
The tax wedge definitions differ somewhat between columns:  1, 2, 4 use the sum of payroll, income 
and consumption tax rates;  3, 5 omit the consumption tax rate. 
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Table 4 
Recent Results on the Impact of Taxation on Employment 
Long-run impact on employment/population rate (%) of a 10 percentage point rise in the tax wedge. 
Cross-section or random effects panel 





Scarpetta (1996)  
(Table 4, col. 3) ) 
-0.3  17 OECD countries 
1983-93 
Standard labour market 
institutions 
Nickell and Layard (1999) 
(Table 16, col.1) 
-2.4  20 OECD countries 
1983-94 
Ditto 
Fixed effects panel 
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2001)  
(Table 5, col.1) 
-1.5  20 OECD countries 
1982-98 
Ditto 
Nickell et al. (2003) 
(Table 15, col.1) 
-2.7  20 OECD countries 
1961-92 
Ditto 
Long-run impact on average hours per week worked by the population of working age (see Table 1, 
final column) of a 10 percentage point rise in the tax wedge. 
Cross-section or random effects panel 
Nickell and Layard (1999) 




20 OECD countries 
1983-94 








7 OECD countries 
1993-96 
No controls 
Long-run impact on the unemployment rate (%) of a 10 percentage point rise in the tax wedge. 
Euro area aggregate time series 
Planas (Table 2,3) et al. (2003)            3.2                  Euro area aggregate           No controls 
                                                                                     1970-2002 
Cross-section or random effects panel 
Scarpetta (1996) 
(Table 3, col.3) 
1.1  17 OECD countries 
1983-93 
Standard labour market 
institutions 
Elmeskov et al. (1998) 
(Table 4, col.4) 
1.2  18 OECD countries 
1983-95 
Ditto 
Impact at average 
levels of co-ordination 
Nickell and Layard (1999) 
(Table 15, col.1) 
2.0  20 OECD countries 
1983-94 
Ditto 
Fixed effects panel 
Daveri and Tabellini (2000) 
(Table 9, col.1) 
5.5  14 OECD countries 
1965-91 
Restricted set of labour 
market institutions. 
Impact at average 
levels of co-ordination. 
Nickell et al. (2003) 
(Table 13, col.1) 
1.1  20 OECD countries 
1961-92 
Standard labour market 
institutions. 
Impact at average 
levels of co-ordination. 
Notes:     
a)  An impact of x hours on average weekly working hours is equivalent to 2.5x percentage  
  points (pps) taking a full work week as 40 hours. 
b)  Prescott computes the tax wedge and predicted hours for seven countries.  For each country  
we compute (predicted hours -  ) ours predictedh ( ) taxwedge taxwedge− ÷  
where the means are across the countries.  The computed impact is the average 
of this ratio across the seven countries.  It is also worth noting that Prescott 
approximates a measure of the marginal tax wedge by multiplying the income 
tax rate by 1.6 in all countries.  In practice this makes little difference to the 
overall cross-country pattern of the tax wedge. 
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Table 5 
Unemployment, Inactivity and Employment by Age and Gender in 2001 
 
 
Unemployment (%)  Inactivity Rate (%)  Employment Rate (%) 
             












  25-54 55-64 25-54 55-64 25-54 55-64 25-54 55-64 25-54 55-64 25-54 55-64
Europe                  
                         
                  
                     
                         
                         
                      
                         
                   
                         
                       
                     
                     
                       
                         
         
         
Austria 3.4 5.7 3.8 5.2 6.5 59.8 23.1 81.7 90.3 37.9 74.0 17.4
Belgium 4.8 3.9 6.1 0.9 9.1 63.4 29.3 84.2 86.5 35.1 66.4 15.6
Denmark 2.9 4.0 4.1 4.0 8.6 34.3 16.5 48.1 88.7 63.1 80.1 49.8
Finland 6.9 8.9 8.0 8.8 9.0 48.8 15.0 50.5 84.7 46.7 78.2 45.1
France 6.3 5.6 10.1 6.6 5.9 56.2 21.3 65.9 88.1 41.4 70.8 31.8
Germany 7.3 10.3 7.7 12.5 5.7 49.4 21.7 67.6 87.5 45.4 72.2 28.4
Ireland 3.4 2.6 3.0 2.7 8.2 33.6 33.9 70.8 88.7 64.6 64.1 28.4
Italy
a 6.4 4.6 12.5 4.9 9.6 57.8 42.1  84.1  84.6  40.3 50.7 15.2
Netherlands 1.4 1.7 2.1 1.1 6.0 48.6 25.8 71.7 92.7 50.5 72.6 28.0
Norway 2.7 1.7 2.5 1.4 8.6 26.4 16.7 36.8 88.9 72.3 81.2 62.3
Portugal 2.6 3.2 4.4 3.1 7.2 36.4 21.9 58.1 90.4 61.6 74.7 40.6
Spain 6.3 5.6 13.7 8.0 8.4 38.6 38.8  76.4  85.9 57.9 52.8 21.8
Sweden 4.4 5.3 3.7 4.5 9.4 26.5 14.4 32.7 86.6 69.6 82.5 64.3
Switzerland 1.0 1.8 3.4 1.6 3.7 17.5 20.7 43.8 95.3 81.0 76.6 55.3
UK 4.1 4.4 3.6 1.8  8.7  35.6  23.6  56.0  87.6  61.6  73.6  43.2
EU 5.5 6.3 7.9 6.6  8.2  47.8  28.4  68.1  86.8  48.9  66.0  29.8
 
Non-Europe 
                
                 
                         
                     
       
Australia 5.5 5.6 5.0 3.3 10.1 40.0 28.6 63.1 85.0 43.3 67.8 35.7
Canada 6.3 6.0 6.0 5.6 8.9 38.8 20.9 58.2 85.4 57.6 74.3 39.4
Japan 4.2 7.0 4.7 3.7 3.1 16.6 32.7  50.8  92.8 77.5 64.1 47.3
New Zealand 
 
4.0  4.0  4.1  2.8  8.7  25.7  25.5  48.2  87.6  71.3  71.5  50.3 
US 3.7 3.4 3.8 2.7  8.7  31.9  23.6  47.0  87.9  65.8  73.5  51.6
a)  2000 
OECD Employment Outlook 2002, Table C. 
Note:  These data do not include those in prison.  This makes little odds except in the US where  counting those in prison would raise the inactivity rate among prime age 
men by around 2  percentage points.               1 6  
Table 6 
 




  Total Men  Women 
Europe     
Austria 6.0  6.2  5.8 
Belgium 15.3  14.3  16.6 
Denmark 8.3  7.3  9.3 
Finland 19.9  19.6  20.2 
France 18.7  16.2  21.8 
Germany 8.4  9.1  7.5 
Ireland 6.2  6.4  5.8 
Italy 27.0  23.2  32.2 
Netherlands 4.4  4.2  4.5 
Norway 10.5  10.6  10.3 
Portugal 9.2  7.2  11.9 
Spain 20.8  16.1  27.0 
Sweden 11.8  12.7  10.8 
Switzerland 5.6  5.8  5.5 
UK 10.5  12.0  8.7 
EU 13.9  13.1  15.0 
 
Non-Europe 
   
Australia 12.7  13.3  12.0 
Canada 12.8  14.5  11.0 
Japan 9.7  10.7  8.7 
New Zealand  11.8  12.1  11.5 
US 10.6  11.4  9.7 
 





1.  Who gets the better dinners is, as yet, an unresolved question. 
 
2.  Of course (7) is not the end of the story, because c/y is endogenous.  Typically, 
however, this ratio is determined by factors other than the tax wedge.  For 
example, if there is no capital and all government expenditure is provided to the 
population in the form of consumption, then c/y=1 whatever the level of taxes and 
government expenditure. 
 
3.  The problem in single country time series investigations is discriminating between 
permanent effects and temporary effects which persist for a long time. 
 
4.  Namely Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, UK (pre-
1980). 
 
5.  In fact the average employment/population ratio in these same countries has risen 
over the same period, so there are obviously other forces at work aside from taxes.  
This overall change is because the rise in the employment/population ratio among 
women has more than offset the fall among men. 
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